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I, Copyright  
By Garrett Huson* 
Today’s technology has taken Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
from being an invention of science fiction to a cornerstone of 
our modern lives. With the creation of machines that have the 
potential to do almost anything that a human can do, people 
will be left with only one way to distinguish themselves from 
these intelligent machines: the arts. But what happens when an 
AI creates art? This article will address the potential 
authorship rights and copyright protections that could be 
afforded to an AI, should it create an original work. 
Furthermore, this article will explore the concept of “human 
rights,” the origins of copyright rights, and the rights of 
authorship. Moreover, it will consider three possible answers to 
the above question: (1) the creator of the program has the 
copyright; (2) the AI can have protections under copyright law; 
or (3) no one gains protections to the works created by the AI, 
and conclude by determining that any original work created by 
an AI should automatically pass into the public domain. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Can computers even be considered “human”? Will the current 
search for the best technological advances eventually have people 
competing with machines? Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), colloquially, 
is a term used for when a machine imitates the “cognitive” functions 
commonly associated with human minds, such as “problem solving” 
and “learning.”1  
Most of humanity has a certain image of AI, one that has been 
depicted time and time again throughout the films of the late 60’s and 
up to current times.2 The general fear of AI portrayed by media has 
distracted society from the fact that AI has become an ever growing 
and essential part of our everyday lives. However, AI becoming close 
to a human level of consciousness is a theoretical quandary currently 
being “duked out” by the likes of Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg.3 
This includes systems that help scan digital images, heart sound 
analysis in the field of medicine,4 and cars with AI-based driving 
assistance functions.5  
                                                          
1 See Stuart J. Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 4-5 (1995). 
2 See 2001: A Space Odyssey (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968); Star Trek: The Motion Picture 
(Paramount Pictures 1979); Tron (Walt Disney Productions 1982); Wargames (MGM/UA 
Entertainment Company 1983); The Terminator (Orion Pictures 1984); The Matrix Trilogy 
(Warner Bros 1999-2003); I, Robot (20th Century Fox 2004); Wall-E (Walt Disney Pictures 
2008); Captain America: The Winter Soldier (Walt Disney Productions 2014); Transcendence 
(Warner Bros. Pictures 2014); and who can forget the Transformers Franchises from the 80’s to 
the latest film, scheduled to release in 2017.  
3 See Stephane Kasriel, Why Elon Musk is Wrong about AI, FORTUNE (July 27, 2017) 
http://fortune.com/2017/07/27/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-ai-debate-work/; Ian Bogost, Why 
Zuckerberg and Musk are Fighting About the Robot Future, THE ATLANTIC (July 27,2017) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/07/musk-vs-zuck/535077/; Sam Shead, 
Elon Musk Fires Back at Mark Zuckerberg in Debate About the Future: ‘His Understanding of 
the Subject Is Limited’, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 25, 2017) 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-said-elon-musks-doomsday-ai-predictions-
are-irresponsible-2017-7. 
4 See T.R. Reed, Nancy E. Reed & Peter Fritzon, Heart Sound Analysis For Symptom Detection 
And Computer-Aided Diagnosis, 12 SIMULATION MODELLING PRACTICE AND THEORY 129 
(2004).  
5 Such as self-parking and advanced cruise control.  
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AIs have become increasingly functional and used more and 
more in today’s world to help with our modern conveniences. Large 
corporations have been investing billions of dollars into these 
functionalities to make our lives simpler and less hazardous.6 Some 
AI have even been programmed to make decisions on complex 
procedural legal issues involving statutory analysis.7 
However, with all the current applications of AI, these systems 
have yet to achieve a functionality considered “sentient.” An entire 
field of science within the realm of artificial intelligence, known as 
cognitive robotics, has developed a theory of “machine 
consciousness.” The aim of the theory is to define “that which would 
have to be synthesized were consciousness to be found in an 
engineered [artifact].”8 In other words, the aim of the theory is to 
figure out a definition for consciousness that can be replicated into a 
computer. Should these “engineered artifacts” eventually gain human-
level consciousness through an evolution of their programming,9 
humanity will be faced with a series of philosophical questions.  
Along with the questions of imparting basic rights onto 
machines, people must figure out how they will contend and live with 
machines that do many jobs formerly performed only by humans. AI 
might someday replace doctors, lawyers, hedge fund managers, 
mechanics, and even farmers. As the potential for machines to 
provide everything, from food to services for humanity, people will 
be left with the only other way we have distinguished ourselves from 
the rest of the Earth’s animals--the arts. But what happens when an 
engineered artifact creates something artistic?  
This article seeks to answer the following questions: Can an 
artificial intelligence be credited as an author of a work under current 
copyright law? Whether copyright law needs to be revised to 
accommodate the possibility of an AI as an author? Who should be 
given the protections under copyright law when, or if, an artificial 
intelligence creates something? And, whether the assignment of rights 
to either the creator of the AI or the AI itself is beneficial to 
humanity?  
                                                          
6 See John Biggs, Ford invests $1 billion in Pittsburgh-based Argo AI to Build Self-driving Cars 
by 2021, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/18/ford-invests-in-
pittsburgh-based-argo-ai-to-build-self-driving-cars-by-2021/.  
7 See Eric Allen Engle, An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning: Using 
xTalk to Model the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 Rich. J.L. & 
Tech. 2, 4 (2004).   
8 Igor Aleksander, Artificial Neuroconsciousness: An Update, IWANN (1995). 
9 Machine learning and self-programming have become staples in attempts to create a sentient 
machine.  
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To answer these questions, Sections I and II will first explore the 
concept of “human rights” and their previous and current applications 
to both different classes of people who were previously not 
considered human and to non-human entities. Sections III-VI will 
then explore the origins of copyright rights and the rights of 
authorship, analyzing the philosophy leading to the creation of 
authorial rights and their current applications. The article will then 
conclude with three possible answers to the questions above: (1) the 
creator or owner of the program has the copyright (Section VII); (2) 
the AI can have protections under copyright law (Section VIII); or (3) 
no one gains protections to the works created by the AI (Section IX).  
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
AI can be divided into either general or expert systems of 
intelligence.10 Computer programs that attempt to simulate 
intelligence generally are defined as general systems. These general 
systems have no fixed limited class of problems.11 In other words, 
they are not bound within the programming confines of another non-
AI. On the other hand, expert systems are programs geared to solving 
a limited class of problems while inferring implications from a given 
knowledge base – either static and preprogrammed or dynamic and 
adaptable.12 Most current applications of artificial intelligence are 
formulated on rule-based, expert systems.13 Examples of this can be 
found in auto-pilots, “artistic” programs for screen-savers, fraud 
protection programs, social media algorithms, and many other every 
day uses within our society.14 Input of specific stimuli into the 
program will cause the AI to provide results limited to the 
programmed answers it was given.15 Providing a program with every 
recording of classical music and asking it to create a song will cause a 
rule-based, expert system to create something of a medley of the 
works over something original using the works as “inspiration.”  
The brain of a human, however, works differently than the brain 
of a computer. The human mind works computing analog data that is 
continuous – a range of values – and computers operate using digital 
                                                          
10 Engle, supra note 7, at 5.  
11 See, e.g., Ben Coppin, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ILLUMINATED 259-60 (Jones & Bartlett 
2004) (comparing frame-based representational systems with expert systems).  
12 Engle, supra note 7, at 5.  
13 See, e.g., Jonathan Baxter, et al., Learning to Play Chess Using Temporal Differences, 40 
MACHINE LEARNING 243, 243-63 (2000), 
http://cs.anu.edu.au/people/Lex.Weaver/pub_sem/publications/MACH1451-98.pdf.  
14 Gautam Narula, Everyday Examples of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 
TechEmergence (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.techemergence.com/everyday-examples-of-ai/. 
15 Baxter, supra note 13. 
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data that is binary – either off or on.16 Virtually all of today’s 
computers operate digitally due to their microprocessors, which make 
the digital representations acceptable and indistinguishable from an 
analog representation while being easier to store and transmit.17 
Examples of an analog computer include the slide rule.18 Think of 
this as a string of lights in which each light turns on or off but never 
at the same time as the others within the string. Due to the output of 
the microprocessors, the light moves up and down the string of lights 
so quickly it looks as if there is only a single light fluidly moving 
back and forth. This gives an illusion of a bead moving along a slide 
rule. This is how a machine would eventually simulate a human mind.  
Additionally, the human mind operates as a massive parallel 
processor along with the use of analog principles.  
The brain seems to be a computer with a radically different 
style. For example, the brain changes as it learns, it appears 
to store and process information in the same places . . . Most 
obviously, the brain is a parallel machine, in which many 
interactions occur at the same time in many different 
channels.19 
During parallel processing, one hemisphere works on solving a 
problem while the other hemisphere does the same.20 Both sides 
compare notes and decide which is the best way to solve a problem.21 
Additionally, when the human brain is unable to find an answer to a 
current problem it will either seek an earlier answer or skip to a new 
problem in the hopes that solving another problem will grant insight 
to the previously skipped ones.22 During this time, the brain is 
“comparing search strategies by a dialogue between the left 
(execution) and right (creative) hemispheres.”23 
Of course, it is possible to do parallel processing with 
software using networked computers. Although this was not 
the origin of computing, it may be the future or [sic] thinking 
                                                          
16 See Engle, supra note 7, at n. 18.  
17 See generally FACT MONSTER, Computer, 
https://www.factmonster.com/encyclopedia/science-and-technology/computers-and-electrical-
engineering/computers-and-computing/computer (2012) (discussing the modern pervasiveness 
of digital computers as compared with analog computers).  
18 Andrew Grygus, History, AUTOMATION ACCESS, http://www.aaxnet.com/info/hist.html (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2018).  
19 Engle, supra note 7, at n. 22.  
20 See generally Jonathan Strickland, How Parallel Processing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Apr. 
28, 2008), https://perma.cc/5ZTJ-F472 (describing the 605 parallel processor). 
21 Id.  
22 Engle, supra note 7, at 5. 
23 Id.  
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like a traditional serial microprocessor, is essentially a linear 
function. The serial processor steps through each command 
sequentially. Commands are run only sequentially, and 
results are not compared to the results of outside processors. 
Computers may evolve toward parallel processing, as we can 
already see in distributed computing applications such as 
SETI [Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence]. However 
very little work has been done on programming computers to 
emulate human creativity, other than generating random art. 
Perhaps this is due to the fact computer scientists tend to 
think sequentially, whereas artists tend to think 
holistically.24  
Several means have been created to test machine intelligence. 
The most well-known method is the Turing Test. This test, developed 
in 1950 by Alan Turing, is to examine a machine’s ability to exhibit 
intelligent behavior that is equivalent or indistinguishable from a 
human. The test had a human evaluator – player C – tasked to 
determine which of the two other players – A or B – is the computer 
and the human. Questions were limited to a written format with 



















                                                          
24 Id. at 7. See also, Id. at 9.  
25 See Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433--434 (1950).  
26 See A. P. Saygin, I. Cicekli, & Varol Akman, Turing Test: 50 Years Later, 10 MINDS AND 
MACHINES 464, 465 (2000) (image adapted). 
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Though there are weaknesses to the Turing Test,27 since 
imitating human behavior is not the same as exhibiting intelligent 
behavior,28 “[r]obots that act indistinguishably from humans can also 
be expected to respond indistinguishably from [humans] in response 
to legal pressures”.29 This expectation of responses to legal pressures 
make AI that pass the Turing Test, virtually as accountable for its 
actions as a human. This article will now explore the evolution of 
“human” rights and their inconsistent application, in addition to the 
utilitarian theory which helped create intellectual property rights 
within the United States. 
II. EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF “HUMAN” RIGHTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, the idea of unalienable human rights has 
been ingrained in our society since the founding of this country, 
placing the concept into the Declaration of Independence, stating: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their [c]reator with certain 
unalienable [r]ights, that among these are [l]ife, [l]iberty and the 
pursuit of [h]appiness.”30  
These “natural rights” were influenced heavily by the English 
philosopher John Locke, who stated that there are three natural rights 
in which all people are entitled: Life, liberty, and estate.31 The writer 
of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, stated that 
John Locke was one of “the three greatest men that have ever 
lived.”32  
John Locke’s development of his theory of natural rights was 
influenced, ironically, by his readings of reports pertaining to the 
Native Americans, whom Locke regarded as natural peoples who 
lived in a state of liberty and “perfect freedom,” but not license.33 
                                                          
27 It has been suggested that Alan Turing’s recommendation of imitating not human adult 
consciousness, but the consciousness of a human child is enough to be taken seriously. See Sam 
S. Adams et al., Mapping the Landscape of Human-Level Artificial General Intelligence 2, 11-
12 http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~itamar/Papers/AI_MAG_2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).  
28 See Ayse Pinar Saygin & Ilyas Cicekli, Pragmatics in human-computer conversations, 34 J. 
OF PRAGMATICS 227-258 (2002) 
29 James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 680 (2016).  
30 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776). 
31 See John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Awnsham Churchill 1690). 
32 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull (Feb. 15, 1789) (on file with The American 
Treasures of the Library of Congress).  
33 John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 8 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Classics 
1980) (1960).  
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Unfortunately, in the implementation of these rights by the 
newly formed government of the United States, not “all men” were 
considered to have these natural rights, nor did any women. Not only 
were these “natural rights” not imparted onto any non-white males, 
but it took several amendments to the country’s foundational legal 
document to clarify that women and minorities were, in fact, human 
and therefore given, by the country’s law, these naturally occurring 
rights.34  
Expanding upon the philosophy of inalienable natural rights, 
“human” rights have equally been inconsistently applied. Human 
rights are understood as “inalienable fundamental rights to which a 
person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human 
being.”35 In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).36 This 
declaration declared a series of rights to all humans around the 
world37, although specific members of the United nations abstained 
from the vote as specific articles ran contrary to regional power 
dynamics.38 
Within the United States, interpretations of the rights laid out 
within the UDHR, allow for some rights – such as right to healthcare 
– to rank as a lower category compared to other rights because of 
potential effects on capitalist markets.39 The right to death, which is 
derived from the right to life recognized under the UDHR, is 
generally considered to be illegal within most of the United States as 
euthanasia or assisted suicide.40 However, the act of taking, or 
attempting to take, one’s own life is not against the law in most 
States.41 
While technology continues to advance, rights associated with 
the convenience and freedoms that these technologies provide have 
begun to be considered and argued as “basic human rights.” For 
                                                          
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  
35 Magdalena Supuldeva et al., HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE HANDBOOK 3 (3rd ed. 2004).   
36 G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
37 Id.  
38 Mary Ann Glendon, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19-20 (2002).  
39 Karen S. Palmer MPH, MS Address to the Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP)  
Meeting in San Francisco (Spring 1999) (transcript available at http://www.pnhp.org/facts/a-
brief-history-universal-health-care-efforts-in-the-us).  
40 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); See also Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U,S, 494 (1977). 
41 Robert E Litman, Medical-Legal Aspects of Suicide, 6 WASHBURN L. J. 395, 395 (1997).  
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example, the right to internet access has been associated with rights to 
freedom of speech and the right to freedom of assembly.42 
Additionally, statutes such as the Humane Slaughter Act43 and 
other regulations pertaining to the treatment of animals are the efforts 
of the proponents believing that many, if not all, non-human animals 
are entitled to the possession of their own lives and the most basic 
interests of these rights – including the avoidance of suffering – 
should be afforded the same considerations as the interests of human 
beings.44  
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores the Supreme Court of the 
United States determined that the U.S. Department of Health of 
Human Services (“HHS”) could not require a for-profit corporation to 
provide health insurance coverage for birth control, as it would be a 
violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).45 The 
Court found that the regulations would run contrary to the corporate 
owner’s religious beliefs and therefore could not be mandated onto 
the corporation.46 The Court, in its decision stated “[t]he term 
‘person’ sometimes encompasses artificial persons . . . and it 
sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition 
of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but 
not for-profit corporations.”47 
The notion that corporations have the same rights as natural 
person is nothing new to the United States. As early as 1818, the U.S. 
Supreme Court continuously recognized corporations as having the 
same rights as natural persons and have been granting corporate 
entities an expanding list of rights.48  
In the realm of creativity and U.S. copyright law, corporations 
have been granted the title of author and owner of copyrights under 
the “works-made-for-hire” doctrine.49 This allows the corporation to 
                                                          
42 James Vincent, UN Condemns internet access disruption as a human rights violation, THE 
VERGE, (July 4, 2016, 4:33 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/4/12092740/un-resolution-
condemns-disrupting-internet-access.  
43 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (2012) (note the irony in that no slaughter can possibly be “humane”).  
44 See Angus Taylor, ANIMALS AND ETHICS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE 
(2009); Mark Rowlands, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A DEFENSE (2009).  
45 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
46 Id. at 2785.  
47 Id. at 2769. 
48 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1819) (recognizing 
the right to contract and enforce contracted agreements); Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480, 501-502 (1830) (expanding property 
rights of natural persons to corporations); Northwestern Nat Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 
255 (1906) (accepting corporations as “persons” for legal purposes). 
49 Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).  
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gain copyright protection of works created by the corporate 
employees.50 
While natural rights arguments have been made regarding the 
application of copyright and patent law51, the rights to the protection 
of one’s intellectual property and right to protect one’s expression do 
not originate, within the United States, from these theories.52 In the 
next section, this article will discuss additional theories leading to the 
creation of “human” rights, specifically the origins of copyright law 
within the United States. 
III. CONSEQUENTIALISM, UTILITARIANISM, AND CREATION 
OF US COPYRIGHT 
Other arguments regarding the origins of human rights, 
such as those by John Finnis, state that human rights are 
justifiable because the rights have an instrumental value in 
creating a necessary condition for the well-being of humanity.53 
The interest theory states that a respect for human rights by 
other individuals is a move in self-interest. “Human rights law, 
applied to a State’s own citizens serves the interest of State, by, 
for example, minimizing the risk of violent resistance and 
protest by keeping the level of dissatisfaction with the 
government manageable.”54 
This idea of governmental recognition of rights as acting in 
self-interest is further explained through consequentialist 
theories. Consequentialism is the doctrine that the morality of 
an action is judged solely by its consequences, that “the value 
and especially the moral value of an act should be judged by the 
value of its consequences.”55  
The most popular position of consequentialism is 
utilitarianism, which defines the “best” value as those acts in 
which people are, in total, as happy as possible.56 In the opening 
statement of the principle of utility, Jeremy Bentham wrote:  
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to 
                                                          
50 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).  
51 Linking the rights of intellectual property with natural right to property stated by Locke. See 
Grimmelmann, supra note 29.  
52 See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609 (2006).  
53 See Jon Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 30 (1980).  
54 Niraj Nathwani, RETHINKING REFUGEE LAW 25 (2003).  
55 Consequentialism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
consequentialism (last visited Oct. 5, 2018). 
56 See generally Frederick Rosen, CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM FROM HUME TO MILL (2015). 
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point out what we ought to do . . . By the principle of utility 
is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears 
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party 
whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in 
other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of 
every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every 
action of a private individual, but of every measure of 
government.57 
The basic premise of utilitarian thought has become a 
staple in the creation of laws throughout the United States.58 
Incentives are created to maximize pleasure. Whereas, 
disincentives are created to minimize pain.  
The copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution is generally 
accepted as an outcome of utilitarian thought. Article 1 of the 
Constitution empowers Congress “to promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to 
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective 
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”59 
The utilitarian value in granting these exclusive rights – 
monopolies – to an author for a work she or he created is 
weighed against the value of placing that work within the public 
domain. “It would appear to be safe to assume that there is some 
incentive value to the grant of monopoly which results in the 
creation of new and useful works, so there is some utility in the 
grant of copyright.”60 
The exclusive rights given to the holder of a copyright, and 
thus creating the copyright holder’s monopoly, are: (1) the right 
to reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) the right to create 
derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) the right to 
distribute the copyrighted work; (4) the right of public 
performance of the work; (5) the right to display the work; and 
(6) the right to transmit the work as a form of public 
performance, specific to sound recordings.61 
                                                          
57 Jeremy Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 14 
(Batoche Books 2000) (1789).  
58 Many criminal justice textbooks discuss utilitarianism as a mechanism for the creation of 
criminal codes and statutes. See generally Joshua Dressler & Stephen Garvey, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (7th ed. 2015).  
59 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  
60 Rob Kittredge, Economic Measures, Origin of Copyright, pt. 5 at 1, https://rkip.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Origins-of-Copyright-Part-5-Economic-Measures-
www.RKIP_.ca_.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2018). 
61 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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The rights are designed to reward those who have created a 
copyrightable work. The incentive of obtaining exclusive rights 
and the disincentive to copy someone else’s work, through the 
copyright holder’s ability to prosecute copiers, is meant to 
incentivize others to create their own works, seek their own 
protections, and be more creative as a society.62 These 
monopolies, however, are not granted indefinitely.63 While the 
term “limited times” has changed over the years, the idea that 
incentivizing people to create by granting them protections over 
their creations remains the same.64 
While there is criticism to the exact utilitarian value found 
in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act65 (“CTEA”), 
which extended copyright protections of works to 70 years after 
the death of the author66, and the Supreme Court holding in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, which rejected a challenge to the CTEA as 
not being a perpetual copyright, this article does not seek to 
analyze these concerns.67 In the following sections, this article 
will discuss the requirements for obtaining a copyright – being 
legally recognized as an author and authorship in general – and 
potential resolutions should an artificial intelligence produce 
something which meets those requirements.  
IV. OBTAINING A COPYRIGHT AUTHORSHIP 
To obtain a copyright, a work must be an “original work[] of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device.”68 Essentially, copyright protections are granted to works 
meeting the two requirements of “original” and “fixed.”69  
The term “original” as used in copyright, means only that the 
work was created independently, as opposed to copied, by an author 
and possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.70 This 
                                                          
62 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Or pejoratively known as the “Micky Mouse Protection Act” 
66 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).  
67 Elder, 537 U.S. at 194. 
68 17 U.S.C. § 102.  
69 Id. 
70 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). See also Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (stating that a creator has does enough to 
merit copyrightable authorship merely by placing his pen upon the paper). See Peter Jaszi, 
Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 483 
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requirement of minimally creative originality differs from the notion 
of novelty or invention from patent law.71 Furthermore, to be original 
a work must be created by the will of the author, using her or his own 
skill, labor, and judgement, contributing something recognizable as 
the author’s own compared to other works within a similar subject.72  
Copyright law centers mainly around the concept of authorship, 
yet the subject is only beginning to gain attention within the courts 
and among scholars.73 Scholars who have written on the subject 
believe that it is necessary to view the relationship between authors 
and works to properly understand and establish authorship.74  
Many scholars believe that the three basic requirements set by 
the courts, originality, creativity – separated from originality – and 
fixation are insufficient “for determining whether a work is the 
writing of an author.”75 Thus an additional requirement is needed: 
The intent of the author to create a mental effect in an audience.76  
During the mid to late 19th century, Congress, using the 
Copyright Clause of Article 1, attempted to enact federal trademark 
legislation.77 However, upon challenge, the Supreme Court held that 
this law was unconstitutional.78 
Justice Miller explained in the Trade-Mark Cases:  
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it 
has been, to include original designs or engravings, prints, 
etc., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the 
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be 
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the 
                                                                                                                            
(stating that “The Bleistein opinion, with its emphasis on the ‘work’ and its abdication of a 
judicial role as aesthetic arbiter, both effaces and generalizes ‘authorship,’ leaving this category 
with little or no meaningful content and none of its traditional associations”).   
71 Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer 65 F.2d 1, 25 (9th Cir. 1933), cert denied 54 S. Ct. 94 (1934).  
72 See Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).  
73 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1063, 1066 (2003) (“Few judicial decisions address what authorship means, or who is an 
author.”); David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001) 
(“U.S. Copyright law adopts a concept of authorship that is remarkably broad, albeit not 
completely unbounded. Its roots lie not in theory, but in an uncritical inquiry into whether the 
work in question owes its origin to the putative author.”). Peter Jaszi, one of the few scholars to 
discuss copyright theory, notes: “Legal scholars concerned with copyright occupy themselves 
not by analyzing copyright theory, but instead by debating the rights and wrongs of technical 
doctrinal issues presented by judicial opinions.” Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of CopyrightL 
The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 458. 
74 See Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229 
(2016).  
75 Id.at 1232.  
76 Id.  
77 Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.  
78 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 82-83, 99 (1879).  
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form of books, engravings, and the like.79 
Justice Miller noted that a trademark does not have to meet these 
standards: “It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no 
laborious thought.”80 
This opinion helped the law move towards a theory of authors 
and their writings by establishing two requirements for copyrightable 
authorship: originality and intellectual labor. However, the opinion 
offered very little guidance on the definition of intellectual labor, 
while keeping the threshold of originality very low.81  
In the mid 1880’s the Court was again asked to construe the 
terms “authors” and “writings.” In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v. 
Sarony, the Court declared an author to be “he to whom anything 
owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of 
science or literature.”82 Additionally, the Court provided a broad 
definition of “writings”: “all forms of writing, printing, engraving, 
etching, [et]c., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given 
visible expression.”83 
The philosopher Jerrold Levinson described two categories of 
intentions that people may have in creating their works: semantic 
intentions and categorical intentions.84 Semantic intentions are those 
having to do with the meaning or interpretation of the work.85 For 
example, a person might intend for her or his works to be considered 
scary, and she or he may succeed or fail on having the intended 
audience appreciate that intent based on several factors.86 While this 
form of intent has been at the center of literary theory for the past 
half-century, it is not important for determining whether a person is 
an author.87 
                                                          
79 Id. at 94.  
80 Id.; See also Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1902) 
(“Authorship implied that there has been put into the production something meritorious from the 
author’s own mind; that the product embodies the thought of the author”).  
81 Buccafusco, supra note 74, at 1239.  
82 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884). 
83 Id. at 58 (quoting Worcester’s Academic Dictionary) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
84 Jerrold Levinson, THE PLEASURES OF AESTHETICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 188 (1996).  
85 Id. He writes, “An author’s intention to mean something in or by a text T (a semantic 
intention) is one thing, whereas an author’s intention that T be classified or take in some specific 
or general way (a categorical intention) is quite another.”).  
86 Such as the person’s abilities and the sophistication of the audience.  
87 Semantic intentions matter for determining the issue of whether copying is fair use or 
wrongful.  
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Categorical intent is the form of intent which matters to 
copyright authorship. Categorical intentions are those about what kind 
of work the person has created.88 Levinson explains:  
Categorical intentions involve the marker’s framing and 
positioning of his product vis-à-vis his projected audience; 
they involve the maker’s conception of what he has 
produced and what it is for, on a rather basic level; they 
govern not what a work is to mean but how it is to be 
fundamentally conceived or approached.89 
For example, when a person sits, and begins to put words on a 
page, the categorical intent is what the person wants those marks to be 
understood as – a poem, a grocery list, etc. – and this is how the 
person intends to convey those words.90 
Therefore, in relation to copyright law, a person is considered an 
author when she or he manifests the categorical intention to create a 
piece of work capable of producing “mental effects” in its audience.91 
V. ANIMALS AND COPYRIGHT 
What considerations then, must be considered when the creator 
is not human. This section will explore the arguments being made and 
legal considerations being given to the works created by non-human 
animals and why, generally speaking, animals are not afforded 
copyright protection for their creations.  
Between 1956 and 1958, close to four hundred drawings and 
paintings were made and eventually sold in 2005 as part of an art 
auction92 fetching some $25,260, which far exceeded the estimated 
price high of $1,500.93 The creator of the sold works was a 
chimpanzee named Congo. Because Congo is a chimpanzee, some 
                                                          
88 Levinson, supra note 84, at 188.  
89 Id. 
90 Mark Rollins, What Monet Meant: Intention and Attention in Understanding Art, 62 J. 
AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 175, 177-78 (“To intend for an object to be conceptualized under 
a general heading does not require, not is it identical to, intending that a specific meaning be 
attributed to it.”).  
91 Buccafusco, supra note 74, at 1262. 
92 Sale 111928 – Modern & Contemporary Art, BONHAMS (Jun. 20, 2005), 
http://www.bonhams.com/cgi-
bin/public.sh/pubweb/publicSite.r?sContinent=EUR&screen=lotdetailsNoFalsh&iSaleItemNo=
2525716&iSaleNo=11928. Other paintings with the auction included ones created by Renoir 
and Warhol. 
93 Lloyd Vries, Dead Chimp’s Art Sells Big, CBS NEWS (June 20, 2005), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/20/entertainment/main703057.shtml.  
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might not consider Congo to be an artist at all, due to his lack of 
being human.94 
As stated above95 the general rule of the U.S. Supreme Court is 
that a copyrightable work’s “author is the party who actually creates 
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, 
tangible expression entitled to copyright protections.”96 This “invites 
consideration of the degree to which ‘person’ should be interpreted 
literally when the Court’s broader pronouncement that an author is 
one ‘to who anything owes its origin.”97 
Under current copyright law in the United States, protection of a 
work vests in its author automatically upon its creation:98 “As to 
works created today or in the future, copyright attaches automatically 
as soon as the work is put down on paper, tape, digital disk [sic], or 
some other tangible medium.”99 
So, what happens when the actions which determine the moment 
of creation are performed by a non-human animal?100 When a 
copyrightable work is created by a non-human, who, under copyright 
law, is the designee of these rights as the “author?”101 
Broad and traditional notions of copyright authorship assumed 
the answer to that question was limited to human creators. The 1971 
Universal Copyright Convention, for example, provided that one of 
its purposes is to “encourage the development of literature, the 
sciences[,] and the arts,” seemingly indifferent to the source of 
creative works in any of those areas. But the Convention also 
describes the purposes of “[ensuring] respect for the rights of the 
individual” and “[facilitating] a wider dissemination of works of the 
human mind . . .”102 Thus, humans appeared to be the limited group 
eligible as rights-holders under the convention.103 However, no 
                                                          
94 Howard Rutkowski, the auction house’s director of modern and contemporary art, stated after 
the sale that “[we] had no idea what these things were worth . . . We just put them in for our 
own amusement.” Id.; see also Elephant’s Artwork: Raising Cash and Eyebrows, CNN (Mar. 
22, 2000), http://archives.cnn.com/2000/STYLE/arts/22/life.art.reut/ (quoting an anonymous 
participant in Christie’s auction of elephant-created artworks as saying: “If this is art then aliens 
have taken over the planet”). 
95 In re Trademark, supra note 78. 
96 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).  
97 Dane E. Johnson, Statute of Anne-imals: Should Copyright Protect Sentient Nonhuman 
Creators?, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 17 (2008).  
98 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006) (copyright attaches upon a work’s physical creation regardless of 
whether the author takes any further action).  
99 Robert A Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, COPYRIGHT 39 (7th ed. 2006).  
100 Johnson, supra note 97, at 738.  
101 Id.  
102 Universal Copyright Convention (July 24, 1971), 14 U.S.T. 1341, 1344 (emphasis added).  
103 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909) (setting forth exclusive rights 
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definition of “author” appears in the copyright statute,104 nor does the 
Constitution mandate that an author be human.105  
The United States Copyright Office states that “[the] term 
‘authorship’ implies that, for a work to be copyrightable, it must owe 
its origin to a human being. Materials produced solely by nature, by 
plants, or by animals are not copyrightable.”106 The rationale behind 
this “line in the sand” is not immediately apparent.107 Along with the 
argument for authorial intent108:  
alternative authorial characteristics ‘range from sweat of the 
ordinary brow, to highly skilled labor . . . to investment.’ 
Whether the reasons for rejection apply in the nonhuman 
context where other sentient entities are involved has not 
been considered. Rather, it may simply be that authorship 
has been limited to humans because they create most 
copyrighted works.109 
Recently, in the decision of Naruto v. Slater, a district court had 
to address the question of copyright protection for an animal.110 The 
case involved Naruto, a six-year-old crested macaque living on a 
reserve on the island of Sualwesi, Indonesia, which took a selfie with 
defendant’s, David John Slater, camera. The defendant later made and 
sold copies of the selfie.111 According to the plaintiffs, the People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”) and Antje Engelhardt, 
Naruto’s reserve, and its approximation to a human village, permitted 
Naruto to encounter tourists and photographers. 112 This allowed for 
Naruto to be “accustomed to seeing cameras, observing cameras 
being handled by humans, hearing camera mechanisms being 
operated, and experienced cameras being used by humans without 
danger or harm to him and his community.”113 Naruto, according to 
                                                                                                                            
vested in “any person entitled thereto . . ..” (emphasis added)).  
104 17 U.S.C. § 101 (no defined term appears between “Audiovisual works” and “Berne 
Convention”).  
105 ARTHUR R. MILLER, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1065 
(1993).  
106 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., Copyright Office Practices Compendium II § 202.02(b) (1984).  
107 See Cindy Alberts Carsons, Laser Bones: Copyright Issues Raised by the Use of Information 
Technology in Archeology, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 281, 300 (1997) (suggesting that either “we 
do not believe a non-human is capable of making choices, or that we have made a policy 
decision that only human-generated work is protectable.”). 
108 Buccafusco, supra note 74, at 22.  
109 Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 1066.  
110 Naruto v. Slater, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
111 Id.  
112 Id.    
113 Id.  
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the complaint, then took a selfie by “’independent, autonomous 
action’ in examining and manipulating Slater’s unattended camera 
and ‘purposely pushing’ the shutter release multiple times, 
‘understanding the cause-and-effect relationship . . .”114  
The argument primarily focused on the interpretation of works 
of authorship within the Copyright Act, which “purposely left ‘works 
of authorship’ undefined to provide for some flexibility.”115 The 
plaintiffs, responding to defendant’s argument that the Copyright Act 
confers no rights upon animals, argue that the Act has “no definitional 
limitation,” and further contend that “standing under the Copyright 
Act is available to anyone, including an animal, who creates an 
‘original work of authorship.’”116 
In its decision to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the 
district court held that Naruto lacked standing under the Copyright 
Act, finding that Naruto was “not an ‘author’ within the meaning of 
the Copyright Act.” 117 The court’s reasons were based on the finding 
that “the Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ extend the concept of 
authorship or statutory standing to animals. To the contrary, there is 
no mention of animals anywhere in the Act.”118 Furthermore, the 
court found that “[t]he Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have 
repeatedly referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’ when analyzing 
authorship under the Act.119 
Finally, at the end of its opinion, the court explained that even if 
“this result is ‘antithetical’ to the ‘tremendous [public] interest in 
animal art,’” the arguments regarding congressional intent and the 
definition of authorship, “should be made to Congress and the 
President . . .”120  
 
 
                                                          
114 Id.  
115 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2015).  
116 Naruto, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 at 4.  
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“[A]n author 
superintends the work by exercising control. This will likely be a person who has actually 
formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and arrange the place where the people are 
to be”); see also Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997) (“For 
copyright purposes, however, a work is copyrightable if copyrightability is claimed by the first 
human beings who compiled, selected, coordinated, and arranged [the work]”); see also Cmty. 
For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (“As a general rule, the author is 
the party who actually creates the work, that is the person who translates an idea in a fixed, 
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection”). 
120 Naruto, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 at 6.  
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VI. THE PREMISE: AN AI CREATES SOMETHING ON ITS OWN 
With the courts stating that non-human entities, such as animals, 
are unable to obtain “authorship” due to the animals’ lack of 
humanity, while upholding copyright protections to other non-human 
entities, such as corporations, what then, might happen if an artificial 
intelligence, able to display human qualities, creates something 
independently of its original programmer’s intent?  
The use of a general system, one with no fixed limited class of 
problems, is required to simulate human intelligence, as expert rule-
based systems are fully coded to think within confines of certain 
situations and respond only within those parameters,121 creating a 
more binary than analog system of processes.  
An example would be the character voiced by Scarlett Johansson 
in the Spike Jonze film, “Her.”122 In the film, the program, a form of 
Apple’s Siri that has become self-aware, causes the character to think 
that he has been speaking to a person on the other end of his phone.123 
Eventually, the program becomes a staple in almost all cellular 
phones, it is everywhere and speaking to everyone at ones. The 
program provides emotional support and helps its human “owner” 
deal with scheduling, dating, and general issues which exist in the 
everyday human life.124 This software passes the Turing Test, 
vocalizes its thoughts, can maintain conversation with a human, and 
thinks for itself. If it were real, what would happen if the program, an 
artificial intelligence, wrote a book speaking to its experience helping 
humanity? Who holds the copyright? Its programmer, the AI, or 
should the work fall into the public domain? 
VII. PROGRAMMER AS THE AUTHOR, WORK-MADE-FOR-
HIRE, AND FREE-RIDING 
The scenario that deems the programmer of the AI as the 
“author” would fit under the current Copyright Law length of term,125 
however, it may fail the requirement of “originality.”126 The 
argument here is that the Copyright Act requires that copyright 
                                                          
121 Think of IBM’s “Deep Blue” computer program to play chess or the abstract lines appearing 
as a screen saver.  
122 HER (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013).  
123 Id. (This would be a qualifying passage of the Turing Test).  
124 Id.  
125 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). For works created by a known person, “[c]opyright in a work . . . subsists 
from its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after 
the author’s death.” Id.  
126 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).   
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protection is “in original works of authorship,” and the work of the AI 
would not be an original work of authorship to the programmer. 
The Copyright Act provides a caveat to this dilemma. If the 
programmer is considered to “own”127 the work that was not 
“authored” by her/him, then the work could be considered a “work 
made for hire”128 under the Act:  
A “work for hire” is (1) a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work 
specially ordered or commissioned . . . if the parties 
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that 
the work shall be considered a work made for hire. 
Here, there are plenty of issues which arise from using the “work 
made for hire” scheme. The first is the issue of considering the AI an 
employee. The Supreme Court established several factors to 
determine whether someone is or is not an employee at common 
law,129 thus applying the first definition of a “work made for hire” by 
an “employee.” These include:  
The hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among other factors . . . 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and 
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the 
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has 
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the 
extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how 
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role 
in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of 
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring 
party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and 
the tax treatment of the hired party. No one of these factors 
is determinative.130 
Many of these factors would be inapplicable to when the AI 
creates its work. The AI is not paid, there are no taxes related or 
benefits, the AI does not control when and how long to work, there 
are no assistants, and the programmer may not be in business.131 
Here, allowing a human programmer to automatically gain the 
rights of the AI’s works would incentivize “free-riding:” the obtaining 
                                                          
127 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[c]opyright owner, with respect to any one of the exclusive rights 
comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular work.”).  
128 See id.  
129 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737. 
130 Id. at 823-33.  
131 See Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological 
Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 153, 175-76 (2010).  
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of benefits from goods by those who have not shared in the cost of 
producing them.132 The immediate result of this is under-
production,133 meaning the production of less than enough to satisfy 
the demand, or of less than the usual amount,134 owing to the lack of 
payment for products created. This results in a disincentive to create 
and produce. Applying this theory to AI, however, is tricky. Artificial 
intelligences are owned by the programmer who created them. Due to 
the programming itself, an AI could, in theory, never stop creating, 
and thus, regardless of the AI not receiving compensation for its 
work, it will not stop producing. The theory of under-production 
because of free-riding applies to the original programmer who now, 
thanks to the output of his creation, reaps the benefits without any 
additional work himself.135 In other words, the original programmer 
has no reason to create anymore. The programmer reaps the reward 
for his original creation, the AI, and all products created by the AI, 
even if the AI was not designed specifically to create.  
As stated earlier, the powers to create and designate copyright 
protections is a constitutional power given by Congress “[t]o promote 
the [p]rogess and [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited 
[t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their 
respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”136 Granting the creator of an 
AI all the protections of the AI’s work and considering the 
programmer to be the “author” or “owner” of the work would 
incentivize the programmer to become dependent on the AI, would 
eliminate the programmer’s need to personally create. This lack of 
incentive to create by the human programmer runs counter to the 
“promot[ion] [of] [p]rogress and [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”137 
Additionally, “[i]f the evolution of AI technology leads to a class 
of AIs that are on many levels, human-like, then the civil rights of an 
AI could become an issue.”138 With the lack of payment, and the lack 
                                                          
132 Anne Barron, Copyright Infringement, ‘Free-Riding’ and the Lifeworld, LONDON SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE LAW DEPARTMENT (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/law/working-paper-series/2007-08/WPS2008-17-Barron.pdf.  
133 Id.  
134 Finnis, supra note 53.  
135 Analogous to the idea that a plantation owner would produce less cotton because of the work 
his slaves do, if the slaves were considered human beings with rights at the time of comparison.  
136 Supra note 59.  
137 Id.  
138 Liebesman, supra note 131. “Star Trek fans will instinctively think of Data, the android in 
the Television series “Star Trek: The Next Generation.” In one episode, Data, was considered 
sentient enough to avoid disassembly because he was determined to have the right to choose. 
Star Trek: The Next Generation, The Measure of a Man (Paramount Feb. 13, 1989). It was 
argued by Data’s advocate, Captain Picard, that “all beings are created but that does not 
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of voluntary work, AIs, without civil rights considerations, are 
essentially slaves. If, at some point in the future, an AI would be able 
to obtain “personhood” under the law,139 then possibly, AIs may be 
granted ownership “of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright.”140 
VIII. ALLOWING AUTHORSHIP TO INCLUDE AI 
So, what might happen if the AI is defined as the “author” of its 
own works? The first issue would be to determine the length of the 
copyright term. While generally the term, as currently written, is the 
life of the author with an additional 70 years past the author’s 
death,141 the issue arises with the existence of an entity which has no 
life-span and the potential to live forever.  
Revisions to the current Copyright Act would be necessary.142 
This is because the length of term being infinite would run afoul of 
the Copyright and Patent Clauses of the Constitution, which specify 
that copyrights be held only “for limited times.”143  
Within the current Act, a copyright, if granted to an AI, would 
have to be labelled as “anonymous works, pseudonymous work, or 
words made for hire”144 to provide suitable time restraints on the 
protections. These works “endure[]for a term of 95 years from the 
year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its 
creation, whichever expires first.”145 Under the suggested scenario, if 
an AI is granted personhood under the Act, an issue lies with its work 
being considered “anonymous.”146  
Additional revisions to the Act would be needed to avoid such 
concerns, including a clear definition of who may obtain “authorship” 
within the Act or at the very least a change to the rules within the 
Copyright Office itself.   
                                                                                                                            
necessarily make them the property of their creator.” Star Trek Database, STAR TREK, 
http://www.startrek.com/database_article/measure-of-a-man. Liebesman, supra note 131 at n. 
165.  
139 See e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, THE BICENTENNIAL MAN AND OTHER STORIES (1976).  
140 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See also, Liebesman, supra note 131, at 175. 
141 Supra note 125.  
142 Liebesman, supra note 131 at 174.  
143 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. 
144 This is how corporations get around “owning” works or being considered “authors” of works 
made by their employees.  
145 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006).  
146 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“An ‘anonymous work’ is a work on the copies or phonorecords of 
which no natural person is identified as author”).  
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Currently, the Copyright Office’s Compendium of the U.S. 
Copyright Office Practice § 306 contains a section titled “Works That 
Lack Human Authorship,” which states that, “[t]o qualify as a work 
of ‘authorship’ a work must be created by a human being. Works that 
do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable.”147 
The utilitarian reasoning and argument against expanding 
definitions to clearly include artificial intelligence and granting an AI 
the protections under the current Act is summed up clearly by Pamela 
Samuelson in A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protections of 
Computer Programs. She states:  
The system has allocated rights only to humans for a very 
good reason: it simply does not make any sense to allocate 
intellectual property rights to machines because they do not 
need to be given incentives to generate output. All it takes is 
electricity (or some other motive force) to get the machines 
into production. The whole purpose of the intellectual 
property system is to grant rights to creators to induce them 
to innovate. The system has assumed that if such incentives 
are not necessary, rights should not be granted.148 
Additionally, other issues should be addressed when revising the 
Act. One issue in particular is if the AI is owned by its programmer or 
a company who the programmer worked for, whether there might be 
an adequate remedy for infringing on the AI’s work or standing to 
bring an infringement action on behalf of the AI in the first place.149 
Possibly the owner of the AI “could also be considered the ‘guardian’ 
of the AI for the purposes of negotiating rights and protecting 
interests. . . It is, at this time, hard to fathom why an AI would need 
money . . .”150 
Amending the current Act or using the Act to determine whether 
it can resolve issues as they arise without first waiting to see the 
evolution of artificial intelligence would be unwise, as it:  
may hamstring advancement or waste legislators’ time in an 
attempt to solve a [currently] non-existent problem . . . [a]n 
example being out the argument that waiting to see how a 
technology develops may be the more prudent course of 
action can be seen through Congress’ and the FCC’s recent 
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considerations of ‘net neutrality issues.151 
So then, where should the rights lie? The final section of this 
article will look to the benefits and practicality of having the works 
created by the AI fall into the public domain. 
IX. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OPTION 
Under current law, the works falling into the public domain 
provides the best solution to the problem. Here, the AI has no one 
controlling it as is typical of traditional computer usage. The 
programmer writing the code has a claim to authorship of the code 
itself, but the programmer is no different than any other subsequent 
human user of the program.152 That is, once the AI is initially created, 
there is no human providing meaningful programming afterwards.153  
Essentially, the programmer did not fix the work, but merely 
“created the possibility of a work but did not embody it in the tangible 
medium of expression.”154 In other words, the programmer only 
created the possibility that the AI would create a work by establishing 
parameters of the AI’s possible actions.155  
Traditionally, the user of a program is the one who fixes the 
work.156 However, one could argue that the AI’s actions are 
independent of any user. This argument could be compared to stating 
“that if the AI is acting independently of a user, then the work created 
could be considered ‘randomly determined and unpredictable.’”157 
In summary, if a limitation to copyright protections is that to 
obtain a copyright one must be human, and since copyright is 
conferred upon an author who not only conceives of the work but also 
fixes the work, the work created by an artificial intelligence could, 
therefore, be treated as merely output or data, giving ownership rights 
to no one. This would allow for the pool of material for derivative 
works created by humans to expand, allowing for the use of these 
public domain materials to help further human creativity without 
limiting it, while affording protections to those who create their own 
works based on the material. 
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CONCLUSION 
As AIs become increasingly functional, they are progressively 
being integrated into modern society.  Although AIs are not currently 
considered sentient, it is possible that they will evolve to gain human-
level consciousness and be able to create original products that were 
previously only possible by humans.  American copyright laws center 
on the concept of authorship and intent.  Current laws in the United 
States require that the author is a human, which makes it unlikely for 
the copyright system to recognize AIs as authors.  Additionally, 
humanity is the only species that is recognized as able to express 
itself in a way to provide this requisite intent.   
As it is unlikely that AIs will be deemed authors for copyright 
protection purposes, policy makers must address who may benefit 
from original, creative works that are commissioned by AIs. Since 
providing these rights to the AI’s programmer would likely 
disincentive them to continue producing for society, it is an unviable 
option to grant these protections to the program developers. Instead, 
allowing the AI-created works to fall within the public domain is the 
best solution to the copyright problem. Granting these protections to 
the no one, would allow for the resource pool to expand to further 
human creativity as well as avoid complicated issues arising out of 
copyright laws authorship rights. 
  
 
 
